## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEVADA

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ROGER HULL,

Case No. 3:12-cv-00476-MMD-VPC

ORDER

Petitioner,

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JACK PALMER, et al.,

Respondents.

This action is a *pro se* petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, by a Nevada state prisoner.

By order filed May 14, 2013, the Court ruled that the amended petition was subject to dismissal because the petition failed to state a claim for habeas relief and claims in the petition were unexhausted. (Dkt. no. 8.)

Petitioner filed two (2) motions for a stay. (Dkt. nos. 9 & 11.) In *Rhines v. Weber*, 544 U.S. 269 (2005), the Supreme Court placed limitations upon the discretion of the court to facilitate habeas petitioners' return to state court to exhaust claims. The Court may stay a petition containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims if: (1) the habeas petitioner has good cause; (2) the unexhausted claims are potentially meritorious; and (3) petitioner has not engaged in dilatory litigation tactics. *Id.; Wooten v. Kirkland*, 540 F.3d 1019, 1023-24 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2008). In the instance case, the unexhausted claims are not potentially meritorious and petitioner has not shown good cause for the failure to exhaust his claims in state court. The motion for a stay is

denied. This action is dismissed for failure to exhaust claims in the amended petition and for failure to state a cognizable habeas claim. *See Estelle v. McGuire*, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991); *Rose v. Lundy*, 455 U.S. 509, 521-22 (1982).

It is therefore ordered that petitioner's motions for a stay (dkt. nos. 9 & 11) are denied.

It is further ordered that this action is dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a cognizable habeas claim and failure to exhaust claims.

It is further ordered that petitioner may file a new habeas petition in a new action, once his claims are exhausted, but shall file no further documents in this case.

It is further ordered that petitioner is denied a certificate of appealability. Reasonable jurists would not find the dismissal of the improperly-commenced action without prejudice to be debatable or wrong.

DATED THIS 3<sup>rd</sup> day of February 2014.

MĪRANDA M. DU UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE